Despite a lack of organization and vision for the future, the protests rocking Iran signal that the Islamic Republic is running out of time.

Is Iran finally on the brink of revolutionary change? Since the current round of protests broke out late last month, all eyes have been on the Iranian “street,” where more and more citizens are turning out in opposition to the country’s clerical regime. As the demonstrations have spread, hopes have risen in the West that this time the political ferment might prove decisive and finally bring about a fundamental political transformation in Tehran. Perhaps it will. But for the moment, the protests unfolding across Iran still seem to be missing two key ingredients. 

The first is inspiration. It’s clear that the Iranian people are deeply discontented over the malaise that has come to characterize clerical rule. And they have plenty of reason to be. 

Iran’s currency is in freefall, inflation is soaring, and ordinary Iranians are increasingly struggling to make ends meet. The regime’s response to all this—offering citizens the equivalent of $7 a month to alleviate economic hardship—is far too little, and much too late.

At the same time, the country is in the throes of a nationwide resource crisis so severe that officials have suggested relocating the national capital and its 10 million residents as a way to alleviate chronic water woes. Meanwhile, Iran’s population of roughly 93 million is steadily secularizing and has grown increasingly hostile to the religious edicts of the country’s ruling religious class. That’s why Iranians now support an end to the Islamic Republic by an overwhelming margin. 

But if the problems with the current order are obvious, it’s far less apparent that there is an alternative vision around which today’s protesters can coalesce. Put another way, Iranians know very well what they’re against, but are far less certain about what they are actually for. 

Clearly, at least some favor a return to the monarchy. Much more so than in past rounds of political ferment, the lion-and-sun flag of Pahlavi-era Iran is evident among today’s protesters, and exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is seen as a potential leader (Pahlavi himself, meanwhile, is actively staking a claim to that mantle). But the full extent of his appeal remains unclear, while other Iranian opposition factions are largely missing in action.

The second shortcoming of the protests, at least at present, is a lack of organization.

Thus far, the unrest has been fragmented, decentralized, and largely spontaneous, rather than strategically coordinated. Sustaining momentum in the face of mounting regime pressure will require greater structure, clearer coordination, and a communication strategy, both within Iran and with the outside world.

That, however, is now more difficult to do. Back in 2009, the “Green Movement” that emerged following the fraudulent reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency showed an impressive degree of technological sophistication, using the internet extensively to coordinate. Iran’s regime mobilized in response and surged online, first to quell the protests and then to deter future ones through a pervasive architecture of monitoring and censorship. Today, Iranian authorities are maintaining this focus and targeting key “communicators” to stifle contact among elements of the opposition.

None of this masks the larger reality: Iran is a country on the cusp of change. Across multiple indices, the Islamic Republic has shown a marked failure to thrive, and those shortcomings have simply become too pervasive for Iranians to ignore—or accept. That’s why recent years have seen a quickening pace of protests, with widespread outpourings against the regime becoming increasingly frequent.

They have also fundamentally changed in their character. Back in 2009, many Iranians still held out hope that some sort of behavioral change on the part of the regime was possible. Fast forward to today, and grievances over women’s rights, environmental collapse, and economic mismanagement cut across class, region, and ideology—and are united by a growing consensus that the Islamic Republic itself is a bankrupt structure.

That consensus doesn’t guarantee imminent regime collapse. But it does suggest that political change is coming to Tehran, and very likely sooner rather than later. 

About the Author: Ilan Berman

Ilan Berman is senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for the US Central Intelligence Agency and the US Departments of State and Defense, and provided assistance on foreign policy and national security issues to a range of governmental agencies and congressional offices. He has been called one of America’s “leading experts on the Middle East and Iran” by CNN.

Image: Photo Agency / Shutterstock.com.

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