Promise that these deregulations will all make things substantially more affordable, then, and voters will likely be disappointed by the results.
And so, Cowen says, we have to understand the incentives of politicians. They want to win elections. If affordability is the frame, they will want to show that they are doing something quickly that binds on prices. Rather than careful deregulation, you’re just as likely going to get promises of huge new subsidies and price caps—Mamdani-ism.
These policies often worsen problems long-term, of course—the main topic of this Substack. Subsidies at best just change who pays rather than lowering costs of provision. In reality, the combination of the price-shrouding that government demand subsidies bring, plus the regulations politicians impose on subsidized services, often drive up costs and market prices further. Price ceilings, on the other hand, create shortages, misallocation, poor quality, and black markets. With policies like government-run grocery stores, you might even get bits of both.
The point is, in today’s environment, this is likely where “affordability politics” ends up. Democrats have shown their susceptibility to “greedflation” type thinking that legitimizes price controls. Republicans will now be looking for quick wins. Indeed, the Trump administration are hardly showing that the alternative to Mamdani-ism is affordability delivered through deregulation. President Trump spent the day after Mamdani’s win detailing new drug price controls.
In our politics today, high prices aren’t seen as information about a good’s relative scarcity. They are thought determined by malevolent actors or seen as barriers to our ambitions—things that raw state power can and should overcome.
We Should Still Do Deregulation Anyway
“If [policymakers] err on the side of inflation, there will be widespread complaining about rising prices to be sure, but that diffuse message is quite drowned in the rising babble of specific demands and concrete proposals from identifiable interest groups — to compensate me, to regulate him, to control x’s prices, and to tax y’s “excess profits”, etc.” Axel Leijonhufvud, 1975
It’s not inevitable that a period of high inflation only encourages bad policy. Many of the deregulations in the 1970s-1980s were undertaken because of significant worry about rising prices (even though these policies would never solve the macroeconomic phenomenon of inflation). But, historically, unpopular high inflation periods, with all the disorienting impacts and arbitrary redistributions they bring, create incentives for economic interventionism, for the reasons Axel Leijonhufvud outlined above.
That is our zeitgeist today. There was an opportunity to frame careful deregulatory reforms as a helpful way of easing living cost and cost disease pressures before the pandemic. Right now, political promises of delivering affordability are promises that won’t meet voters’ ambitions after a high inflation moment.
None of this is to say we shouldn’t still remove tariffs, end the Jones Act, liberalize land-use and energy markets, deregulate childcare, and all the other good supply-side policies that might lower prices. Call this what you like: abundance, or efficiency, or pro-growth policies or whatever. But if affordability becomes the frontline political promise in today’s environment, the quest for rapid results will see more Mamdani-ism and long-term destruction.