Is this the End of Bashar Al-Assad?

Syrian rebels—long thought to have lost their fight against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime—shocked the world on December 1 after overrunning Syria’s second city, Aleppo, amid a panicked Syrian Arab Army (SA) withdrawal. Then came an even more shocking moment: the fall of Hama for the first time in the nearly fourteen-year conflict. At the time of this writing, rebel forces are continuing their lightning march toward Homs as fighting heats up in the eastern and southern parts of the country. The widespread battle could determine the future of Syria in the medium-to-long term and will drastically shake up the geopolitical map of the country in the short term.

What is Happening in Syria?

The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) armed group previously based in northwest Syria’s Idlib Governorate announced its “Deterring the Aggression” offensive on November 27. Within days, HTS captured most of Aleppo Governorate—an effort that took pro-Assad forces years to achieve with the backing of Russian airstrikes and Iran-backed militias like Lebanese Hezbollah. Just one week later, Hama fell, with HTS and its allies securing major highways on their advance south to Homs.

Thus far, Moscow and Tehran have provided notably limited support to Damascus. Both countries remain bogged down by wars elsewhere, with Tehran’s capacity to defend Assad’s territory remarkably diminished due to Israeli airstrikes against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF)—the foreign arm of Iran’s elite security forces. Hezbollah, meanwhile, lost most of its leadership and now faces a flailing ceasefire in Lebanon. It is critical to note that Iran gradually withdrew its senior officers from Syria earlier this year as a result of Israeli threats.

Turkey—the primary backer of the official armed Syrian opposition and holding holding some influence over HTS—is straddling a difficult balancing act. While HTS needed and likely received approval to conduct its operation, it is highly doubtful the Turks approved one of this scale. A more likely explanation is that Ankara hardly expected this degree of success.

Given Turkey’s core interest in Syria no longer includes regime change but rather entails preventing any Kurdish terrorist group buildup on its southern border, the Turks likely approved an operation to pressure Assad into bilateral talks. Additionally, Ankara hopes to forcibly return Syrian refugees to northern Syria—accomplished in part by expanding opposition territory in Syria, albeit while risking instability that could stymie the effort. Whether Russia—a strong supporter of Syria-Turkey talks—tacitly approved Ankara’s approach is unclear.

Indeed, while Turkey supports HTS and other opposition elements currently fighting Assad, their more likely goal was to both pressure the Syrian president with a marginally successful military offensive toward Aleppo while increasing pressure on the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stronghold of Tel Rifaat just north of the city. Ankara possibly presumed that the former would force Assad to finally hold bilateral re-normalization talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. At the same time, the latter would remove a key national security threat close to the Turkish border—namely, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) aligned People’s Defense Units (YPG) militias in the area.

As such, the Turks appear to have lost control of the situation, with HTS rapidly advancing south. Its calls for reconciliation between the rebels and the regime highlight this dynamic. Upcoming meetings in Doha on December 7 and 8 under the Astana framework will be crucial to monitor as key international stakeholders position themselves and their local partners in what is now a rapidly shifting geopolitical map after years of “freezing” the conflict. One fact is certainly clear: any strategy aimed at freezing this war was bound to fail as the diverse array of actors involved in the fighting continued to jockey for power and influence—most notably HTS.

Who is Fighting in the North?

Major concerns exist about HTS’s intentions as it rapidly expands its territory, especially regarding minorities, given the highly sectarian nature of the conflict. The group is a former Al-Qaeda offshoot that has moderated substantially in recent years away from what can loosely be described as fundamentalist Salafism to a political Salafism akin to many Islamist political parties across the Middle East. While it still commits to a very conservative Islamic political system and society, it has proven to be adept within the political and governance spheres.

This includes public messaging efforts aimed at populations in areas recently captured—including minority communities. HTS continues to stress that all are welcome so long as they reject Assad. The group has backed its statements with action and is attempting to ensure and enhance public services to build trust. Still, concerns about the group and its past are valid, especially considering it repressed protests in its Idlib stronghold earlier this year and has a long history of arbitrary detention, torture, and other human rights violations.

Importantly, HTS is not the only actor fighting in this offensive. The coalition it leads includes many armed groups, including some under the official Syrian opposition-aligned Syrian National Army (SNA). This group, however, is mostly focused on fighting in the Tel Rifaat area north of Aleppo against the SDF. Ironically, it is the SNA that is arguably more violent and brutal today than HTS, behaving more like a criminal gang than a genuine liberation movement while also enacting the true interests of its Turkish patron.

Other actors are seizing the moment across the country as well. In the south, former opposition elements and Druze militias in Suwayda formed the “Southern Operations Room.” This is critical given the strong revolutionary impetus from the “Southern Front” in the past. Similarly, reports of SDF advances in the east and rumors of Islamic State movements are shifting a political map long dominated by pro-Iran elements. However, it should be noted that much of the Islamic State reporting stems from the SDF, who are incentivized to promote such messages given their U.S. backing. The Syrian regime appears to have largely pulled out of the east at this point.

Where is this Headed?

It is incredibly difficult to know where the renewed fighting in Syria is headed today. At the time of this writing, HTS seized Al Rastan and Talbiseh—cities on the road to the strategic city of Homs. If Homs collapses, the blow could threaten the regime’s control of the Syrian heartland.

It remains to be seen whether Assad’s allies can or will provide more support. Given the series of events, one would have expected more support to arrive before Hama fell—possibly in order to signal the continued strength of the Axis of Resistance after crippling Israeli strikes. A possible reason for this could be Israeli threats to target any pro-Iran elements crossing into Syria in support of Damascus—a notable threat given the scale and success of Israeli operations in recent months against these groups.

While it is still possible for Assad to hope for a surge of support that checks the rebel advance at Homs, the time for Damascus’ patrons to deliver passed days ago. Otherwise, they would not have allowed the situation to reach this critical juncture. This suggests limited capacities and geopolitical concerns may be driving the so-called “Axis of Resistance” strategic thinking, even given public expressions of support.

Still, some Iran-backed militias in Iraq reportedly continue to send fighters into the country in small numbers, but this has yet to turn the tide. While informed sources claim Hezbollah will not send its forces to Syria, other reports suggest some fighters have passed into the country following Hama’s collapse. Any reinforcements will make rebel efforts more difficult, especially as they reach cities increasingly aligned with the regime and willing to fight back alongside the Syrian Army and its allies.

Ultimately, powerful actors outside of the pro-Assad camp—including Israel and the United States—do not prefer to see a full HTS takeover of the country, given the group’s history. Recent U.S. statements suggest major ongoing apprehension in this regard. There are also more conventional questions about HTS’s capacity to stretch its forces further south beyond Homs. These realities misplace any presumptions about the fall of the regime at this stage.

A more likely immediate outcome of the renewed fighting is a surge of sustained violence in the short- and medium-term, with potentially game-changing consequences in the medium- to long-term. Assad’s regime finds itself at its weakest since the early days of the war when it fought rebels in the suburbs of Damascus. Whether recent developments can lead to a decisive and lasting change in the conflict rather than more prolonged suffering and destruction remains to be seen.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Hanohiki / Shutterstock.com.