Iranian Regime Experts Highlight Tehran’s Strategic Impasse – OpEd

“Tehran now faces a choice. Individuals, organizations, and governments often encounter complexities when making decisions; at times, they must choose between bad and worse. In the current context… continuing the war means further blows to Iran, potentially extending beyond military strikes to harm Iran’s political standing and create fundamental issues for us.”

These statements are from an analysis by a government-affiliated analyst published in Ham-Mihan newspaper on November 2, portraying the regime’s impasse.

For a long time, terms such as “deadlock,” “stalemate,” “quagmire,” and “no way forward, no way back” have been frequently used in state-affiliated newspapers and media to describe the current situation of the regime.

On September 11, Shargh newspaper published an article titled “We are Checkmated,” written by Mostafa Hashemi-Taba, a former presidential candidate close to regime supreme leader Ali Khamenei. He wrote: “All signs, both external and internal, show that we are in a deadlock. This is not related to this government or that one, and everyone knows we are stuck, but they pretend otherwise, saying ‘hopefully, it’s just a minor issue’… This deadlock is not only because of U.S. sanctions and related European and East Asian measures; even if we woo the U.S., accept the FATF, and face no trouble with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the deadlock will still continue.”

A significant point in the current situation is that regime experts and officials clearly link the regime’s impasse to the consequences of its warmongering policies. They write: “The events of the past year have shown that Iran’s power strategy is weaker and more unstable than expected… When the prolonged conflict escalated into a full-scale confrontation and parts of Hezbollah were paralyzed, it became evident that Iran’s perception of its power was overestimated” (Ham-Mihan newspaper, October 1).

In this situation, Khamenei has confronted the reality that the same warmongering policy he adopted a year ago to shield the regime from uprisings and the threat of social protests has now become so entrenched that it has transferred the crisis into the regime itself.

It is worth noting that after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon and Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Massoud Ali, a cleric in Khamenei’s circle, said in a speech aired on state TV on October 24: “After Ismail Haniyeh’s martyrdom, for two months we did not respond adequately. During those two months, the media and social networks were filled with questions! Commanders of the IRGC, General Bagheri, General Salami, General Hajizadeh were accused of political impotence. The term ‘political impotence’ was widespread, with questions like why are you hesitating, why don’t you retaliate? Severe mistrust had set in!”

Another significant point from the admissions of regime theorists and officials is what a government analyst in Ham-Mihan newspaper on November 3 called an “existential problem.” He emphasized that at the end of the warmongering policy, the regime is not choosing between “bad and worse,” but “worse and the worst.” He explained, “It may go beyond military strikes, affecting Iran’s political standing and even leading to an existential problem for us.”