China’s Information War In Africa – Analysis
By Samir Bhattacharya and Yuvvraj Singh
In 2014, during the Central Foreign Affairs meeting in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping advocated for strengthening China’s soft power globally by improving how the country communicates its message. In the subsequent years, Chinese state-controlled media focused on cultural investments and international cooperation, establishing marketing networks and expanding the reach of quality cultural assets abroad, particularly in Africa.
China’s African outreach
China’s information campaigns in Africa are subtle, focusing on economic issues and promoting apositive narrativearound its investments, mainly in the Belt and Road Initiative. State-controlled media outlets likeXinhua, China Daily, China Radio International (CRI), and CGTN(formerly CCTV International) play a vital role in this narrative.
Meanwhile, StarTimes, a Chinese-owned media company, has become Africa’ssecond-largestdigital TV provider, with over 13 million digital TV and 20 million streaming subscribers. It has invested over US$2 billionin digital TV infrastructure across 30 African countries.
Additionally, China actively produces documentaries to enhance its soft power, such as Africans in Yiwu, TAZARA: A Journey without an End, and Bobby’s Factory. For instance, the docuseries “Bobby’s Factory” focuses on a Chinese factory owner in Africa and his positive interactions with local workers. Another series, “TAZARA: A Journey without an End”, highlights the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) project, a symbol of China-Africa cooperation under the broader umbrella of BRI.
Consisting of three episodes, “A Railway of Friendship”, “The Life Line”, and “Love for Tazara”, the docuseries delves into the emotional connection of the railway line and how it positively impacted Tanzanian youth. Similarly, “Africans in Yiwu-Chinese Meet Africa” depicts stories of hardworking and enterprising people living in Africa and their efforts to bridge the China-Africa gap. Finally, ‘My China Story’ features Africans sharing positive experiences from their time in China, further shaping a favourable image among younger generations.
China’s information strategy in Africa
China has adopted a three-pronged strategy in its information campaign in Africa. First, it hosts and trains numerous African media professionals each year, teaching them to promote Chinese investments as a positive force. Second, China invests in local African media outlets, influencing their editorial practices to align with the Chinese narrative.
For example, StarTimes formed a joint venture with the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), securing a majority stake. Finally, China sells technology to African governments that enables tighter control over digital information, including blocking websites and shutting down internet access. During the 2020 Tigray Conflict in Ethiopia, for instance, Ethio Telecom used technology and expertise from Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE to suppress dissent and limit information flow.
Chinese content frequentlydownplays local criticismsof its projects, such as labour disputes, environmental issues, and debt concerns, leading to a distorted view of Sino-African relations. DuringZambia’s 2016 elections, Chinese-owned and local media outlets portrayed Chinese investments as beneficial to Zambia’s future economy, favouring pro-China candidate Edgar Lungu.
InKenya’s 2017 elections, China’s increasing role as an infrastructure financier was prominently featured. CGTN Africa portrayed the erstwhile President Uhuru Kenyatta as a symbol of modernity and progress, stressing his consent for projects like the Standard Gauge Railway while overlooking public concerns about sustainability and costs and minimising opposition critiques. In Zimbabwe,China has actively supported the ZANU-PFPolitical Party byrestricting civil societymovements and opposition and advancing narratives favourable to China’s interests in politics and business.
In order to negotiate contracts and trade agreements, China also generates new narratives. Angola, a major oil producer, has received substantial Chinese infrastructure loans in exchange for future oil exports to China. Chinese media have framed these infrastructure projects as “infrastructure-for-oil,” portraying them as vital for Angola’s recovery after decades of Civil War. This strategy has ultimately enabled China to gain long-term access to Angola’s oil reserves at favourable prices.
Similar tactics were observed in Zambia, where the China Nonferrous Metal Mining Company (CNMC) secured a significant stake in Zambian copper mines, aided by favourable media coverage that overlooked labour issues and environmental concerns. Similarly, China established a presence at Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, downplaying worries about Djibouti’s increasing reliance on Chinese loans. Other strategically important projects, such as Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport and Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, allowed China to reap significant economic and geopolitical advantages by undermining debt concerns and promoting a pro-China narrative.
China’s media influence under scrutiny
Local perceptions are evolving as more and more African nations speak out against the adverse consequences of Chinese narrative-building.Hakainde Hichilema, the President of Zambia, has voiced concerns about the growing influence of foreign countries in the media, citing China, in particular, for shaping narratives and favouring specific perspectives. Similarly, Chinese investments and loans are frequently presented in an unduly flattering light, according toOby Ezekwesili, a former politician from Nigeria who is currently the Vice President of the World Bank Africa. Ezekwesili has questioned the lack of transparency in contracts granted to Chinese enterprises. She has alleged significant narrative control by Chinese-backed media.
Concerns regarding Chinese-owned social media apps like TikTok are also growing because they are perceived to be susceptible to politically-driven actions. Several nations, like Senegal and Somalia,formally prohibitedthe app in 2023, claiming security and moral concerns. Others, including South Africa and Kenya, have petitioned againstWeChat and TikTok, among other apps.
Controlling the narratives
CCP’s investments in the African media landscape influence access to information and shape key narratives, although the impact of Chinese messaging remains mixed. Officials within African regimes are often more receptive to China’s governance model and messaging. However, ordinary Africans bear the brunt of this narrative battle, inundated with conflicting misinformation designed to sway public opinion and erode societal cohesion. There is an urgent need for awareness campaigns to educate these politicians about the long-term risks to their sovereignty.
- About the authors: Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow and Yuvvraj Singh is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation
- Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation