Xi Jinping’s Policies Are a Continuation of Mao’s and Deng’s
The Hoover Institution’s Elizabeth Economy, one of our country’s best Sinologists, has written an important essay in the Diplomat about the continuities in the domestic and foreign policies of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping. It is titled “The 75-Year Quest to Make China Great Again,” and Economy concludes that “a closer examination of Xi’s rejuvenation strategy reveals that contemporary China is not only rooted in an enduring set of political and economic principles and institutions established at the inception of the country … but also reflects a high degree of continuity” in the policies pursued by Communist China’s most consequential leaders.
Many U.S. China experts emphasize the differences between Mao, Deng, and Xi, especially when they assess the wisdom or futility of American foreign policy vis-a-vis China. And there have been differences. Mao imposed radical experimentation on the Chinese people with the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the horrific Cultural Revolution. Deng imposed economic reforms while maintaining tight political control, which enabled China to grow economically and militarily. Xi has transformed China’s economic and military growth into geopolitical ambition, most notably via the Belt and Road Initiative and the buildup of China’s naval and nuclear weapons power.
The most important aspect of continuity between these three leaders is their unstinting adherence to the centralized control of China by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Thought, and Xi Jinping Thought share this common characteristic — it is the basis for CCP control of the country. Economy notes that highly centralized party rule, party control over social and political life, education, media and the legal system, and state control of economic institutions were/are reflected in the policies of all three leaders. Economy believes that President Xi sees himself as following in the political tradition of Mao and the economic tradition of Deng. But Deng also acted politically Mao-like, especially during the Tiananmen Square uprising and in his “anti-corruption” or party purge campaigns.
Xi Jinping’s push for the “liberation” of Taiwan is likewise firmly in the tradition of Mao and Deng. Economy writes, however, that Mao and Deng evidenced a degree of flexibility on the timing of Taiwan’s “liberation” or “reunification” that is lacking in Xi’s approach. Mao, of course, in the 1950s sought to forcibly “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland. The first attempt was foiled when President Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait at the beginning of the Korean War. The next two attempts involved the shelling of Kinmen and Matsu in the mid and late 1950s, but President Eisenhower successfully ended those threats. Thereafter, Mao, consumed by internal turmoil that he caused within China and later needing the help of the United States to deter the Soviet Union, was less belligerent about Taiwan. Deng, Economy notes, “evinced a similar degree of long-term strategic patience” on this issue.
Xi, on the other hand, appears to be reverting to Mao’s impatience of the 1950s. Newsweek reports that China just a few days ago “mobilized its army, navy, air force, and rocket force, including one of its aircraft carriers, for a joint military exercise around … Taiwan” that replicated a blockade of the island. Economy writes that Xi has “ramped up military exercises around Taiwan, meddled in Taiwan’s elections, halted formal political dialogue with Taiwan, and reduced tourism to bring economic pressure to bear on the island nation.” Xi, Economy notes, evidences a greater sense of urgency about reunification with Taiwan than post-1950s Mao and Deng. And Xi now possesses much greater relative military power than Mao or Deng ever did.
Economy’s assessment supports Bradley Thayer’s and James Fanell’s conclusion that when post-Cold War American political, financial, and business leaders embraced China, it was “America’s greatest strategic failure.” It was very much politically a bipartisan failure from Bill Clinton’s administration through Joe Biden’s administration, with the exception of the last two years of the Trump administration when the national security focus shifted from peripheral conflicts to great power competition, and the administration rhetorically emphasized the China threat. The bipartisan failure resulted from wishful thinking and greed, and it has placed the United States in a geopolitical disadvantage in the western Pacific.
Economy concludes her valuable essay by suggesting that Xi’s economic policies may slow China’s economy to such an extent that it will undermine his credibility and perhaps the legitimacy of communist rule. But if that happens, Xi may divert China’s attention from domestic ills by appeals to nationalism and patriotism connected to the reunification of Taiwan. We’d better be prepared for all such contingencies.
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