Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), plans to initiate the impeachment of President Salome Zurabishvili (again.) This is the second attempt and it is likely to fail because the ruling party lacks the constitutional majority to pull it off.

The move is symbolic, but it has a clear purpose coming just two weeks before the critical parliamentary elections on October 26. The results are likely to shape the country’s internal political development, as well as its foreign relations, for many years to come.

In truth, none of Georgia’s political parties are in especially good condition.

The opposition, a kaleidoscope of groupings, have in the past traditionally struggled to gain substantial public support, largely because of internal and sometimes personality-driven splits.

Recent attempts to unite various political factions have had some effect, producing a few small coalitions. There are 18 parties and coalitions registered this time, less than half the number in 2020. Yet they remain to be hampered by a lack of financial resources and leaderships with a questionable appeal to a broad voter base. Even the largest opposition party, the United National Movement (UNM), faces challenges with its absence of compelling leadership (its effective head, Mikheil Saakashvili, is in prison) that weakened its standing as a credible political alternative.

Meanwhile, Georgian Dream is judged by recent polling to be the party likely to secure more votes than any other. It enjoys strong support in rural areas as well as among socially conservative sections of the population.

But this doesn’t guarantee victory. It will need to win enough seats to form a parliamentary majority, enabling the party to override presidential vetoes and amend the constitution.

Current trends suggest that achieving this level of dominance will be difficult. Though Georgian Dream has expressed its desire to continue on the path towards EU membership, the bloc has expressed deep concern about some of the party’s statements. In July, it froze the country’s accession process.

The party has pledged “Nuremberg-style” trials for opponents and described the opposition as the plaything of a “global party of war,” a phrase that appeared to encompass unidentified forces in the US and EU. Sanctions are promised in case the governing party returns, confronts its Western partners and becomes a “one-party state.”

Opinion pollsters have recorded huge differences in their findings. The last for US-based Edison Research showed Georgian Dream on 32%, down about a third on its 2020 result and probably unable to form a government. The UMN was on 20%, also down somewhat, but smaller groups like the Coalition for Change would take about 12%, Gakharia’s for Georgia 12% and Strong Georgia about 10%. That indicates a far stronger showing for third parties.

The Gorbi research organization, which shows better results for the governing party, found Georgian Dream on 59%, the UNM on 13% and a clutch of smaller parties on around 5%. That suggests a better result for the ruling party both the previous elections in 2016 and 2020.

To accept this, one would need to believe that the mass protests in April against the Russian-inspired foreign agents law had not only melted away but never represented the sentiments of most Georgians. Yet opinion polls have consistently shown Georgians heavily in favor of membership in both the EU and NATO, part of a West which the ruling party has described as the party of war.

Georgian voters have in the past shown their disgruntlement with politicians by refusing to vote. In 2020, only 56% bothered to turn out in the first round and 26% in the second.

That might change if the young people who led the April protests turn out to vote in greater numbers this time. Voters under 30 now seem less apathetic.

Georgia’s foreign relations with Western countries are now poor. Throughout this year, there have been rising tensions between the Georgian ruling party and the EU and United States, which have raised question about the viability of Georgia’s Western aspirations. On October 10, the European Parliament demanded action against Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and applauded US measures announced in September aimed at Interior Ministry officials and extreme right-wing politicians.

Washington and Brussels have taken several steps, including limiting their financial support and pressuring Tbilisi to reverse its policies. The Georgian side too has threatened to reconsider close ties with Washington.

Both sides seem to be unrelenting in their approach and it’s easy to imagine that a contested result and possible protests against that, will see a serious worsening of relations.

It is hard to see European capitals and the US simply acceding to the termination of Georgia’s longstanding efforts at democracy-building and a crackdown on the opposition.

A possible course of events has been widely suggested by both the ruling party and the opposition — a declaration of victory by Georgian Dream, a refusal by the opponents to accept it, allegations of vote-rigging followed by mass protests, and widespread arrests by the police.

This in turn would pave the way for a much quicker warming of ties with Russia, and the possible opening of talks for Georgia to seek return of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, occupied by Russia since 2008. Although progress in resolving these conflicts has been limited, a decisive shift by Georgian Dream might make such a deal worthwhile for the Kremlin.

But it’s a big ask. Cutting loose the two regions would be a betrayal of everything the Kremlin has said and promised. While that may not worry Putin and his aides, it’s far from clear they would be willing to take this step. Indeed, in his most recent statements, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that there will no reversal of Moscow’s approach. He even added that Tbilisi should instead be looking for reconciliation with the two regions as independent states.

Additionally, Moscow’s shift in South Caucasus regional alliances — moving away from Armenia and strengthening ties with Azerbaijan — further underscore the significance of the Middle Corridor, a trade route involving Georgia, which has grown since 2022.

Moscow’s recent decision to suspend financial aid to Abkhazia further heightened hopes for a shift in Kremlin’s approach. Moscow has even lifted all remaining visa requirements which Georgian nationals needed for longer stays in Russia.

And the prize for the Kremlin is considerable — a friendly government in Georgia, and endless possibilities to complicate life for the West, which now relies on energy corridors across the country from the east and southeast.

The stakes for these elections could hardly be higher. On the one hand, continuing down the difficult road to prepare for membership of the great Western clubs. On the other, being drawn into a geopolitical camp led by Russia — a scenario that Georgians dread.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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