Silent Resurgence: Al-Qaeda’s Stealth In Taliban’s Afghanistan – OpEd

Since regaining control of Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban has promised the world it will not allow the country to become a hub for international terrorism. In a highly publicized agreement with the United States, the Taliban pledged not to let Al-Qaeda, the terror group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, use Afghan soil to threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies. However, less than a month after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, U.S. security experts have warned that Al-Qaeda could reconfigure itself in Afghanistan within a few years.

According to former European Union and United Nations adviser Michael Semple, this forecast may be overly optimistic. Semple points out that Al-Qaeda could rebuild much faster due to the favorable environment provided by the Taliban’s new regime. The appointment of Mullah Tajmir Jawad as the deputy head of intelligence underlines this concern. Jawad, a former commander of the Haqqani network, is now overseeing the most sensitive areas of Afghanistan’s security. Before his appointment, he was reportedly running a suicide bomber training camp—a grim signal of the environment Al-Qaeda now enjoys in Afghanistan.

Jawad’s appointment is not an isolated case. The Haqqani network, a brutal wing of the Taliban with long-standing ties to Al-Qaeda, holds prominent positions in the new Taliban government. Figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Interior Minister, and his uncle, Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, who heads the Ministry of Refugee Affairs, represent more than just names on a cabinet roster. Both are U.S.-designated global terrorists, with the State Department offering millions in rewards for information leading to their capture. Yet, they now hold key portfolios in Afghanistan, giving Al-Qaeda an open pathway to rebuild its networks.

The relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network stretches back decades. The two groups are bound by ideological alignment and intermarriage, making it more difficult for any outsider to sever their ties. Even before the Taliban seized power, Al-Qaeda operatives were embedded within Taliban units, a reality underscored by the U.N.'s June 2021 report that noted the presence of Al-Qaeda fighters and other extremist groups in Afghanistan. These ties are not merely ideological; they have practical implications for Al-Qaeda’s ability to operate and recruit from Afghanistan.

Unlike in the 1990s, when Al-Qaeda openly used Afghanistan as a base for launching global terror attacks, experts now suggest the group may adopt a more covert strategy. Al-Qaeda, analysts believe, is unlikely to repeat the mistakes that led to the downfall of the previous Taliban regime. Instead of drawing unwanted international attention by planning large-scale attacks on the West, Al-Qaeda may pursue a lower-profile approach, working through regional affiliates across the Muslim world. This ‘hub-and-spoke’ model, in which Afghanistan becomes a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda’s leadership while regional franchises carry out operations, poses a different kind of threat. Semple argues that Al-Qaeda’s ties to the Haqqani network give it a major advantage. With the Haqqanis in control of key ministries, Al-Qaeda has effectively secured a safe haven in Afghanistan. "What more could you dream of than to have your well-wishers take over the Interior Ministry?" Semple remarked.

U.S. officials have expressed growing concern about Al-Qaeda’s resurgence. General Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, testified before Congress in late September 2021 that a reconstituted Al-Qaeda with aspirations to attack the U.S. is a "very real possibility." These concerns are not speculative.

Despite mounting evidence, the Taliban has repeatedly denied Al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told reporters in Kabul that there are no Al-Qaeda members in the country and that Afghanistan will not pose a threat to any other nation. Yet, these assurances ring hollow, particularly given the Taliban’s appointment of individuals like Jawad and the continued influence of the Haqqani network in the government. Furthermore, the Taliban has strongly opposed U.S. drone strikes and “over-the-horizon” operations aimed at targeting terrorists in Afghanistan. Accusing Washington of violating international law, the Taliban has insisted that the Doha agreement—which led to the U.S. withdrawal—prohibits such actions. This diplomatic posturing, however, is likely aimed at deflecting attention from the real issue: the Taliban’s inability or unwillingness to rein in Al-Qaeda.

As Afghanistan re-emerges as a potential safe haven for Al-Qaeda, the international community faces a critical decision. Will they trust the Taliban’s assurances and allow them to govern unchallenged? Or will they maintain pressure to ensure that Afghanistan does not revert to being a launchpad for global terrorism? For now, Al-Qaeda seems content to keep a low profile, rebuilding in the shadows. But the question remains: how long before the silent resurgence becomes an open threat?