The country faces a defining moment. On October 20, voters will choose their next president and decide whether to enshrine the country’s European course into its constitution. The stakes could hardly be higher.

Among the 11 presidential candidates, polls show President Maia Sandu leading the race with just over a third of the vote (around 36% and her nearest opponent, a pro-Russian politician, at 10%.) Her campaign is built on Moldova’s EU candidate status, positioning her as the architect of the country’s European future and promising to fast-track EU accession by 2030.

That’s underlined by her decision to hold a referendum in parallel to the presidential vote on whether to add Moldova’s EU ambitions to its constitution. An October opinion poll shows 63% supporting the proposal.

While her core message resonates with many Moldovans, who see European integration as a path to stability and prosperity, Sandu’s domestic record faces scrutiny. Critics argue her much-touted justice reforms have fallen short, and the failure to dismantle oligarchic networks — a key promise of her 2020 campaign — remains a weakness.

This has opened the door for challengers like Alexandr Stoianoglo, the former prosecutor general now polling at 10% in the presidential vote. Backed by the Socialist Party and close to former president Igor Dodon, he is campaigning for judicial reform, though an investigation for corruption and abuse of office has undermined his message.

Other candidates, polling between zero and 7%, are struggling for visibility. Renato Usatîi, leader of the pro-Russian Our Party claims to champion national development but is seen by some voters as tainted by his ties to Moscow and oligarchic networks.

Natalia Morari, a journalist, also faces questions over alleged Russian financial backing, while ex-Prime Minister Ion Chicu, a former ally of Dodon who presents himself as a nationalist critic of Sandu, carries the weight of Moldova’s political past.

With no candidate likely to win outright, a second-round run-off on November 3 seems inevitable, leaving Moldova’s future hanging in the balance.

Beneath these political dynamics lie stark socioeconomic realities. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest nations, grappling with high unemployment, low wages, and widespread emigration. As the World Bank said in April: “Despite sustained economic growth over two decades, poverty remains pervasive, particularly in rural regions, with limited access to services and viable economic opportunities.”

Many Moldovans, particularly in rural areas, remain skeptical of European integration, fearing it would exacerbate economic inequalities or undermine national sovereignty. Such doubts are especially felt among older people and minorities, like the Gagauz, who have historically leaned toward Russia. As part of its campaign of direct interference in Moldova’s affairs, the Kremlin is offering Gagauz pensioners and public sector workers $100 monthly through payment cards issued by a bank linked to the Russian defense ministry. The average pension is about $220.

Sandu must address the concerns of Moldova’s left-behind voters if she is to secure the country’s European path.

By holding the referendum on the same day as the presidential election, the president aims to boost turnout and emphasize the centrality of the EU question to Moldova’s future. But while the polls suggest a pro-EU majority, support is far from overwhelming. At least 14% of voters are undecided, and the outcome remains uncertain. High turnout could be the key.

The EU has a significant stake in the outcome. Moldova’s accession would further strengthen the bloc’s influence in South-Eastern Europe, acting as a bulwark against Russian aggression. It could also mark a decisive moment where the country turns away from Russian-inspired Eurasianism and chooses a European future.

Brussels has provided financial aid, political backing, and technical support to help Moldova’s reform efforts, but there is concern over how committed the EU will remain if internal divisions persist (Georgia has huge majorities for EU and NATO membership, but its Kremlin-friendly government seems determined to terminate its liberal democratic route and the EU is already responding. The country votes on October 26.)

Moldova’s success depends not only on its own political will but also on the EU’s long-term commitment to seeing the country integrated into the European fold.

Russian interference has further heightened the stakes. Moldova’s election and referendum are under intense Kremlin pressure, as it actively works to undermine the process. Moldovan authorities report that more than $15m in Russian funds have been funneled to some 130,000 citizens through networks linked to the fugitive oligarch, Ilan Șor, quite apart from its Gagauz scheme (see above.) It estimates the Kremlin may be funneling a total of $100m to sway the campaign in addition to the long-running covert involvement of its intelligence agencies.

Officials describe the interference as “unprecedented,” and say it is a clear indication of Moscow’s intent to sway the outcome and keep Moldova in its sphere of influence.

Financial influence and disinformation have exposed Moldova’s vulnerabilities as the Kremlin exploits internal divisions to regain its grip.

The country of just 2.5 million people is now caught in the broader geopolitical contest between Russia and the West. It is a crucial juncture. The integrity of its elections and referendum will have consequences far beyond its borders, impacting the regional balance of power.

Voters face a clear choice: align with the EU or remain tethered to Russia. The EU path offers more than economic stability; it would provide the institutional reforms and rule of law Moldova needs to break free from corruption and oligarchic control.

Remaining in Moscow’s orbit offers only stagnation and continued dependency, with Russia leveraging financial tools and disinformation to erode Moldova’s sovereignty.

The risks of a failed referendum or inconclusive presidential election are considerable. Should Moldova falter in its pro-EU course, Russia would likely intensify its efforts to destabilize the country, using every available lever to prevent its neighbor from slipping away. For Brussels, a missed opportunity could signal a weakening of its influence in South-Eastern Europe, further emboldening Moscow.

Anda Bologa is an independent expert on AI and digital policy, Central European foreign policy, and transatlantic affairs. She was a Denton Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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