The refinement paradox and cumulative cultural evolution: Complex products of collective improvement favor conformist outcomes, blind copying, and hyper-credulity

by Elena Miu, Luke Rendell, Sam Bowles, Rob Boyd, Daniel Cownden, Magnus Enquist, Kimmo Eriksson, Marcus W. Feldman, Timothy Lillicrap, Richard McElreath, Stuart Murray, James Ounsley, Kevin N. Lala

Social learning is common in nature, yet cumulative culture (where knowledge and technology increase in complexity and diversity over time) appears restricted to humans. To understand why, we organized a computer tournament in which programmed entries specified when to learn new knowledge and when to refine (i.e. improve) existing knowledge. The tournament revealed a ‘refinement paradox’: refined behavior afforded higher payoffs as individuals converged on a small number of successful behavioral variants, but refining did not generally pay. Paradoxically, entries that refined only in certain conditions did best during behavioral improvement, while simple copying entries thrived when refinement levels were high. Cumulative cultural evolution may be rare in part because sophisticated strategies for improving knowledge and technology are initially advantageous, yet complex culture, once achieved, favors conformity, blind imitation and hyper-credulity.