The Radicalization Of Chinese Grassroots That Affects China-Japan Relations – Analysis

By Zhou Chao

Since 2000, the relations between Japan and China have entered a turbulent period, marked by territorial and maritime disputes, geopolitical conflicts, historical issues, and ideological confrontations. Not surprisingly, multifaceted oppositions between the two have become apparent. The influence of simplified narratives, such as anti-Japanese themed dramas produced in China, has continuously dragged the bilateral relations into a state of stagnation. However, compared to the overall downturn in relations, official efforts to improve ties have not been completely interrupted. During Shinzo Abe’s first term, the idea of establishing a “strategic mutually beneficial relationship” was proposed; and during Yasuo Fukuda’s premiership, this relationship was officially established.

Since then, despite experiencing multiple setbacks and interruptions in high-level communication between China and Japan, efforts to promote the positive development of bilateral relations at the top levels have never ceased. In November last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in San Francisco, where both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and consensus of the four political documents between the two nations. They reconfirmed the positioning of their bilateral relationship as a comprehensive strategic mutually beneficial partnership, dedicated to building constructive and stable ties that.

Starting from June this year, high-level interactions through various channels between the two have become quite frequent. Although Japan has generally adopted a stance aligned with the U.S. regarding sanctions on China's high-tech industries, its economic and trade relations with China continue to develop. According to Japanese statistics, Japan's trade with China still contributes a surplus of JPY 5 trillion, which helps stabilize the Chinese renminbi exchange rate. In terms of specific aspects of containment against China, Japan has maintained a certain distance from the U.S.

When it comes to cultural exchange, there has been a noticeable wave of engagement, especially through Japanese anime and manga. In the past two years, anime films such as Slam Dunk, as well as Makoto Shinkai's Suzume and Your Name have been released in China. With the passing of the beloved Japanese manga artist Akira Toriyama this year, interest in his classic Dragon Ball has reignited across mainland China.

While higher-level interactions between China and Japan have remained warm, the common people-to-people relations have become increasingly strained, marked by a series of notable "anti-Japanese" incidents in China. These include a young girl in Suzhou being arrested for wearing a kimono, an attack on a Japanese school bus resulting in one death, and an act of vandalism and public urination in Japan by Chinese influencers seeking attention.

The most recent and severe case involved an attack that resulted in the death of a child at a Japanese school in Shenzhen, which has provoked a strong reaction from the Japanese public and government. Despite local authorities labeling many of these events as "isolated incidents", such an act suggests a growing and concerning anti-Japanese sentiment at the grassroots level.

ANBOUND’s founder Kung Chan pointed out that this series of incidents involves the actions of Chinese grassroots citizens and lower-level law enforcement units, whose behavior is clearly not in line with the central government's approach and lacks the awareness to truly align with it. This disconnect reflects a radicalization of such a section of the grassroots populace.

Indeed, this segment of the society is highly susceptible to being influenced. They generally have lower levels of education and lack the critical thinking skills necessary to engage with knowledge and culture, often acting impulsively with a severe lack of rational thought. In terms of educational background, 40.5% of Chinese internet users have only a middle school education, 21.5% have completed high school, vocational, or technical school, and just 18.8% have attended college or higher. A notable 19.2% of internet users have only an elementary school education or less, indicating very limited literacy skills. As of June 2020, the average internet user in China spends 28 hours online per week. Despite this significant amount of time, there are major questions about what they are consuming and what they are gaining from it. Although China's internet population is vast, at 998 million, among the largest in the world, less than 10% hold a bachelor's degree or higher. Even among those with higher education, many have not received proper training in logical reasoning, making China's online community largely a massive grassroots group with a strong presence but very low levels of rational judgment.

This reflects the current situation of China's grassroots population, which has been significantly influenced by widespread internet culture. In recent years, the rise of parochial nationalist sentiment has gained notable traction. Due to the large proportion of internet users with lower educational backgrounds, these trends have shaped a collective mindset in society, attracting a broad base of followers, including some marginalized intellectuals. Over time, this has contributed to these ideas becoming part of the mainstream cultural discourse in China. On the surface, movements such as "patriotic business", opposition to certain reforms, resistance to the English language, and occasional xenophobic sentiments might appear to be niche interests, but they often reflect broader social tensions. These groups may use the internet as a platform to express various frustrations, which can occasionally manifest in larger movements.

As Mr. Kung Chan noted, the grassroots population is particularly vulnerable to being radicalized. Currently, their focus is directed at foreigners, manifesting as xenophobia. However, with the right provocation or if public opinion policies remain inconsistent, this radicalism could easily shift inward, potentially targeting broader segments of society. In China today, there seems to be a structured process for the development of such societal radicalization. The first step begins when influencers and independent media outlets identify a potential issue that aligns with politically acceptable positions, operates within safe boundaries, and can easily spark public interest. Once identified, media from across the political spectrum coalesce, amplifying the narrative and collectively driving a large-scale public opinion wave. The second step sees the rapid, unstoppable growth of this online movement, allowing no room for dissent. As momentum builds, the narrative breaks through small circles, eventually resonating with nearly all of China's internet users, creating a broad societal consensus. The third step occurs when this consensus and public sentiment are captured by individual opinion monitors, who relay the information to higher-level authorities. This feedback loop not only influences, but can also exert pressure on leadership decision-making at the highest levels.

In reality, this is a well-established process that has become increasingly visible, giving rise to unwritten rules and informal networks within society. This system, while overshadowing and undermining the mainstream narrative, has become a common mechanism for influencing and radicalizing the grassroots population through social media. Often unknowingly, the public is manipulated to become followers of influencers. These influencers direct public outrage toward pre-selected issues, providing a channel for individuals to express their personal frustrations, thereby creating the illusion of widespread social unrest.

Starting with the unconscious radicalization of the grassroots, followed by the orchestrated surge in online public opinion, Chinese society has developed a unique and uncontrollable social environment, distinct from other countries, which carries serious consequences.

After the incident in Shenzhen, major Japanese media outlets, including Yomiuri Shimbun, closely followed the situation. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida immediately expressed concern and protest, stating that the attack was “an extremely despicable crime” and urged China to ensure the safety of Japanese citizens in the country. Kishida emphasized, "We strongly demand that China provide an explanation regarding the details of this case. It has been over a day since the crime, and we have requested that they offer an explanation as soon as possible. Such incidents must never be repeated. We strongly urge China to guarantee the safety of Japanese nationals". For Japan, a country known for its restrained rhetoric and the use of language, the severity of Kishida's statement is unprecedented.

Perhaps more significant and severe than Japan's official response is the reaction from Japanese civil society, particularly the actions of Japanese companies. Following the attack, Panasonic and Toshiba both issued notices allowing their employees in China to temporarily return to Japan with their families, with all costs covered by the companies. This is almost equivalent to a wartime evacuation operation. While conflicts between governments can be adjusted over time, the emotional responses within common people are much harder to repair. Despite China's expression of "regret and sorrow" following the Shenzhen attack, because the incident has deeply affected civil society, even a change of multiple foreign ministers may not be enough to mend the damage. Many of China's previous diplomatic efforts seem to have been in vain as a result. More concerning is that it is not just Japan that is outraged by the Shenzhen incident. From the UK to the U.S., and across Europe, the global response has been nearly unanimous in condemning this repeated targeting of a child as cowardly. China's international image has taken a significant hit, sinking to a new low.

For a considerable period, China-Japan relations were, in essence, better than China-U.S. relations. Even during China's economic surge, Japan was still providing financial aid to China. While Western political circles called for "decoupling" from China, Japan followed but maintained some reservations. In response to repeated U.S. demands for Japan to expand its involvement in Taiwan Strait affairs, there has been strong resistance from the Japanese public. Notably, in recent years, Japanese pharmaceutical companies have significantly supported Chinese pharmaceutical firms in expanding internationally, which has been a key factor behind many Chinese pharmaceutical companies achieving record profits this year. Clearly, given the intense competition between China and the U.S., China is likely to continue relying on Japanese technology and businesses now and in the future, rather than reducing this dependence. Unfortunately, the recent extreme actions by grassroots individuals in China have provided Japan's conservative forces with more justification to suppress opposing voices and strengthen efforts towards a full alignment with the U.S. in countering China. Additionally, the potential negative butterfly effect on Southeast Asian countries, where Japan holds significant influence, should not be underestimated.

To some extent, the relationship between China and Japan resembles the past relationship between Russia and Germany, where both had a mutual need to resist geopolitical pressures. The issue lies in China's inconsistent policies, which fail to distinguish clearly between China-Japan and China-U.S. relations. Instead, both are categorized under the label of "Western forces" and considered to be hostile towards China. This perspective poses significant risks for the future of China-Japan relations, especially as grassroots attitudes become more radical. In such a scenario, any efforts by the leadership may prove futile. Therefore, it is crucial for China's future policies to end this wavering and ensure that positive policy influences can penetrate the grassroots level. The time has come for a change in direction and a reassessment of the signals being sent.

Final analysis conclusion:

If China remains inactive in critical policy areas, it will inevitably provide Japan's conservative factions with further leverage. Japanese companies may increasingly take the initiative to withdraw from China, which could lead to widespread, voluntary disengagement from trade. Official relations could follow suit, with the Japanese government aligning more fully with the anti-China bloc. All in all, China needs to reflect on such a situation.

• Zhou Chao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.