Iran Is Using Foreign Islamic Centers to Spread Terror and Hatred; the World Must Close Them

Last month, Germany announced that it would deport Mohammed Mofatteh, the former director of Hamburg’s Shi’a Islamic Center, which local authorities had ordered shut down five weeks earlier for propagating extremism, and for its financial links to Hezbollah.

Mofatteh, according to German authorities, was getting direct orders from the Iranian Supreme Leader’s office about radical public messaging on the current war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.

Since it banned Hezbollah as a terrorist organization four years ago, Germany has closed six Iranian-linked Islamic Centers and deported some of their officials. In November 2022, Germany expelled the deputy director of the Hamburg Shi’a Islamic Center. In June 2024, the German government ordered the deportation of the director of a Berlin-based center.

Other countries should follow Germany’s approach.

After nearly four decades of virtually unhindered activity, Iranian-backed cultural centers and mosques have proliferated outside the Middle East. They have indoctrinated, radicalized, converted, and mobilized thousands of locals, who, unlike Mofatteh and his colleagues, cannot be deported.

Cases in point: Pro-Iranian centers exist in Italy, Spain, and South Africa. Their directors are, respectively, Italian-born, Spanish-born, and South African-born graduates of Al Mustafa. They peddle pro-Iran and pro-Hezbollah narratives through their centers’ activities.

The main bastions of Iran’s ideological influence beyond its borders are mosques and cultural centers, directly controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, or linked to Al Mustafa International University, an ostensibly academic institution also under Khamenei’s direct control.

The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Al Mustafa in 2020 for its role in Iran’s propaganda efforts, including support for the training and indoctrination of Shiite militias.

With a budget of more than $100 million a year, directly provided by the Office of the Supreme Leader, Al Mustafa has been able to train tens of thousands of emissaries, who are now deployed overseas to spread the word of Iran’s sponsored Axis of Resistance and recruit locals to the cause of Khomeini’s revolution. Establishing mosques and cultural centers is central to this elaborate, global effort to spread Iran’s revolutionary brand. These institutions pose as places of worship and cultural inquiry. In fact, they are propaganda tools in the ayatollahs’ war against the West.

Beyond Europe, the problem is even more acute. European governments can and should follow Germany’s example, since they rely on robust counter-terrorism legislation and designations of organizations like Hezbollah — albeit, in most cases, just the so-called military wing.

Countries in Latin America and Africa, on the other hand, do not have as strong a legal framework to take similar actions. But Iran’s propaganda networks are very active there.

According to the 2015 annual posture statement of the then-US Southern Command’s leader, General John F. Kelly, Iran had by then established more than 80 centers in the Western Hemisphere. That number has since grown. Moreover, a Middle East Forum 2018 report identified 17 Al Mustafa branches in Africa, alongside dozens of schools and other institutions affiliated with it, and thousands of students and graduates.

Al Mustafa’s propagation model relies on its graduates as force multipliers. Many return to their home countries to open and run new centers, while their alma mater supports their work from regional headquarters headed by Iranian officials. Al Mustafa, for example, has a regional headquarter, headed by its permanent representative, Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Nejad, in Venezuela and a campus in Johannesburg, run by a South African cleric trained in Iran. Clergy from the various centers routinely meet and coordinate propaganda activities, while emissaries travel to and from Iran regularly.

There are sparse but notable exceptions to the laissez-faire approach of governments that host Iranian centers.

Last April, Brazilian immigration authorities detained Sheikh Ruben Edgardo (aka Suheil) Assaad, a key Iranian propaganda emissary, as he arrived in São Paulo, Brazil, from Doha, Qatar, to attend a Western Hemisphere gathering of Iran and Hezbollah clergy. Brazil’s federal authorities believe Assaad is linked to Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. On that basis, they put Assaad on the next plane to Doha and will no longer grant him entry into the country.

Yet, while Assaad may no longer visit Brazil, there remains a robust cohort of Al Mustafa-trained Shi’a clerics with local citizenship running centers across the region.

Assaad trained many of them, alongside his boss, sheikh Mohsen Rabbani, who is wanted by Argentina’s authorities and Interpol due to his role in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires that was destroyed by a suicide car bomb in 1994, leaving 85 people dead and more than 200 wounded.

The problem is even more acute now.

Since October 7, 2023 — when Hamas massacred 1,200 Israelis, triggering a new conflict in the region on behalf of its proxy, Iran — Tehran and its proxies have been leveraging their networks overseas, including their cultural and religious centers, to carry out terror attacks, while whipping up a frenzy of anti-Israel hatred in the public sphere.

Last November, Brazilian authorities foiled a Hezbollah plot to target Jewish institutions in Brasilia, the country’s capital. The point man in the plot, a Hezbollah member with both Syrian and Brazilian citizenships who sought to recruit Brazilian nationals with a criminal background, was instrumental in the recent establishment of an Iranian cultural center in Brasilia and was closely connected to both a prominent Shi’a Brazilian convert and key Iran propagandist, and to a Shi’a cleric who works in a São Paulo Shi’a mosque affiliated with Hezbollah.

In August, a Tajikistan national and graduate of Al Mustafa was arrested in Central Asia, where he was allegedly plotting terror attacks. Other plots have also just emerged in France and Germany, where local Iranian proxies followed a similar modus operandi and sought to recruit criminals to carry out terror attacks.

At this critical juncture, governments must do more: Minimizing the risk of terror attacks requires not only foiling active plots but also nipping in the bud efforts to radicalize and incite captive audiences.

Closing these centers, as Germany did; denying entry to Iranian clerical emissaries, as Brazil did; and monitoring the content of sermons and the dissemination of literature and proselytizing material by Iran-affiliated centers, are all urgently required steps that must be undertaken elsewhere by governments to protect their citizens from Iranian-backed terror.

Western governments have routinely undertaken similar actions in the past, when the threat from Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State was most acute. There is no reason they should not do the same with Iran, its proxies, and the elaborate web of cultural and religious institutions they use to spread Iran’s radical extremism.

Wouldn’t it be better to preempt the next attack, rather than have a government’s leaders commit themselves to renewed vigilance while standing in the smoldering ruins of an Iranian-backed strike?

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington DC-based non-partisan research institution focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on X @eottolenghi

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