Chinese Arctic Ventures: A new threat to climate change vulnerabilities
China’s policies and actions towards the Arctic have grown in recent years. These have culminated with the acceptance of China as an Observer to the Arctic Council in 2013, but, even more importantly, with the adoption of the first ever Chinese Arctic government policy paper in 2018.
The white paper stresses China’s commitment to upholding the institutional and legal framework for Arctic governance and to respecting the sovereign rights of the Arctic states. On the other hand, it asserts China’s right as a non-Arctic state to participate in Arctic affairs[i] under international law. China’s Arctic policy suggests a strong desire to push for the internationalisation of the Arctic’s regional governance system. The white paper is not a strategy document, and is more interesting for what it omits, such as the national security dimension[ii] that is a major driver of China’s Arctic ambitions.
Beijing’s Tryst with the Arctic
China’s participation in Arctic international co-operation is fairly recent, even if the country became a party to the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1925. The country became a member to the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996 but only in 2007 did it start to send delegations to the meetings of the Arctic Council, the predominant inter-governmental forum for the discussion on Arctic issues. During the years immediately preceding Beijing’s acceptance as a formal observer[iii] in the Arctic Council, there was a noticeable uptick of media reports and academic studies[iv] regarding the country’s emerging policies in the Arctic, including references to China as both a ‘near-Arctic State’ (近北极国家) and an ‘Arctic stakeholder’ (北极利害关系国), despite the fact that China does not have an Arctic border. The shortest distance between the Arctic Circle and China’s northernmost point, in Mohe County (漠河县), Heilongjiang province at 53°33′ N, is more than 1400 kilometres.
China recognises the sovereignty of Arctic states, but simultaneously applies standard interpretations of international law to legalise the presence of extra-regional states[v]. While Beijing consistently frames its engagement in the region as a strategy of mutually-beneficial cooperation, some Arctic countries have raised significant concerns about its growing economic presence, warning that China may leverage its geopolitical influence[vi] to change the existing norms and rules in the polar region. The Arctic has also become an area of growing Russian and Chinese cooperation[vii]. The Sino-Russian joint statement from February 2022 declares, “The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.” This mention of the Arctic is the first of its kind in a Sino-Russian joint statement, and it arguably indicates how a weakened Russia increasingly dependent on China[viii] could be willing to compromise on its resistance toward allowing non-Arctic states to play a stronger role in the region.
China acknowledges for the first time that its Arctic interests are no longer limited to scientific research but extend to a variety of commercial activities. These are embedded in a new China-led cooperation initiative which aims to build a ‘Polar Silk Road[ix] that connects China with Europe via the Arctic and corresponds to one of two new ‘blue ocean passages’ extending from China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, launched in 2013.
In a speech given by then-Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the annual Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavik in October 2015, a brief, six-point plan for China’s emerging Arctic policies have been emphasised by him. They are, namely the need for future exploration and knowledge about the region, the protection and ‘rational use’ of the Arctic, respect for the inherent rights of Arctic States and indigenous peoples, respect for the rights of non-Arctic States and the international community, creation of a ‘multi-tiered co-operation framework for win-win results’ in the region, and the need for continued observance of relevant international law and institutions, including UNCLOS and the Spitsbergen Treaty.
The first three points were hardly ground-breaking and were assumed to be a normal stance by an Arctic Council Observer seeking to build an Arctic identity. However, the fourth, fifth and sixth points were a tacit statement that China wished to play a more central role in future Arctic affairs. This is evident from the Chinese commercial “salami-slicing” tactics in Norway and other Nordic states in the Arctic.
Case of Norway
Recently the Norwegian government has called off a plan to sell the last privately owned piece of land on the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard in order to prevent its acquisition by China. The remote Sore Fagerfjord property in south-west Svalbard of mountains, plains and a glacier – was on sale for €300m. The archipelago is located halfway between mainland Norway and the North Pole, in an Arctic region that has become a geopolitical and economic hotspot[x] as the ice melts and relations grow ever frostier between Russia and the west.
Svalbard is governed under an unusual legal framework that allows foreign entities to gain footholds in the region. A treaty signed in 1920 recognises Norwegian sovereignty over the territory but also gives citizens of the signatory powers – which include Russia and China – the same rights to exploit its mineral resources. Per Kyllingstad, a lawyer who represents the sellers, previously said he had received “concrete signs of interest[xi]” from Chinese potential buyers who had “been showing a real interest in the Arctic and Svalbard for a long time”. He said the sale was a unique occasion to grab the “last private land in Svalbard, and, to our knowledge, the last private land in the world’s high Arctic”. In 2016, Oslo paid €33.5m to acquire the second-last piece of private land on Svalbard, near Longyearbyen, which was also reportedly being eyed by Chinese investors.
Beigin’s Harmful Impact on Academic Integrity
Polar scientific collaborations can be seen as part of broader and more strategic bilateral relationships between China and the Arctic countries. Among them, Iceland has been the most proactive and has been consequently developing its closer relations with China for around a decade, including a bilateral Arctic science exchange that commenced in 2011. In the case of Norway, following the restoration of relations between the two countries in December 2016, in April 2018 Norway’s Minister of Research and Education led a delegation of 250 of the country’s heads of universities and scientists to strengthen the Chinese-Norwegian research collaboration.
Researchers may be influenced either directly or indirectly to produce results that support China’s Arctic plans and strategies. By offering generous grants and treating researchers with dinners and gifts, government-funded academic exchange programmes and conferences aim primarily to build trust and strengthen China’s status as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder that is not only interested in the region’s resources. However, in addition to the positive outcome of increasing Arctic researchers ‘understanding of the Chinese context, these forums may put academics under pressure to censor their words. Although the Arctic context is less sensitive than many other sectors, it is a priority for the Chinese government to advance an image of China as a responsible Arctic stakeholder[xii]. For this reason, it is indeed within the realm of possibility that exceptional actions, such as refusing to grant a Chinese visa, could be taken to minimise the harm to country’s international reputation.
China: A Bad examples in Tackling Climate Change
China’s NDC is not very ambitious and the state is likely to meet or exceed it, which allows the party-state to ‘gain face’ both home and abroad. China is not likely to commit itself to a very ambitious emissions reductions target in the future either; such a commitment would cause a high risk of ‘losing face’ in the case of failing to reach the target. China’s NDC is “highly insufficient” in order to reach the Paris Agreement’s goal to limit the global temperature rise to 2°C unless other states do not implement much more ambitious emissions reductions measures. In particular, China has not indicated how much its emissions will grow before they peak. In 2015, a number of Arctic Council observer states submitted — on a voluntary basis — their national reports on enhanced black carbon and methane emissions reductions, including France, Japan, Poland, Spain, Korea, India, Italy and the EU. However, China has not submitted its national report[xiii].
China’s role as an emitter of greenhouse gases, including short-lived climate forcers, is part of the country’s broader environmental footprint in the Arctic. Chinese actors may affect Arctic habitats more directly through the investments of Chinese companies in places such as Greenland, northern Canada or Siberia. Chinese demand for resources[xiv] is the key contributor to the extractive industries investment potential in the Arctic. For instance, in 2013, China imported more than 60% within the international iron ore trade. The country accounted for 44% of global nickel demand in 2011. China is a major and growing market for pulp derived from boreal forests. Moreover, Chinese shipping activities have marine and air environmental impacts in the Arctic, impacts that are bound to increase with growing traffic.
China contributes to the environmental problems of the Arctic, most conspicuously through the impacts of climate change, but also other pollutants that end up in the Arctic. Beijing unfortunately does not participate in the Arctic Council Working Group’s work on black carbon and methane, which could present an important contribution to addressing the impacts of climate change in the North, where part of the black carbon that is deposited there has its origins in China.
China’s Dubious Acts with Indigenous People
China perceives that there are no indigenous peoples in China, as for Beijing indigeneity arises exclusively from the context of colonisation and conquest. Thus, in the view of the Chinese government, the issue of Arctic’s indigenous rights does not apply to China itself, which means that any of China’s international statements on indigenous issues are seen in Beijing as having no implications for China’s internal affairs, including in relation to international criticism of the Chinese government regarding its policies towards minority ethnic groups, in particular Uighurs and Tibetans. Chinese investors and financial institutions have been accused in the past of neglecting indigenous interests in places such as Africa or South America, in particular in cases of hydropower, mining and agricultural projects.
China’s approach to Indigenous Peoples’ questions is complex. Beijing does not consider any of the ethnic or minority groups inhabiting its territory to have the status of an indigenous people. However, China is a fairly consistent supporter of indigenous rights internationally. However, so far Beijing has not spoken of indigenous issues in terms of indigenous rights. Nor has Beijing organised any practical co-operation with the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants organisations, in contrast to, for instance, Singapore, India or the European Union.
Chinese investments related to tourism have proven controversial in some parts of the Arctic. In northeast Iceland, Svalbard and in the Lyngen area in Norway, Chinese billionaire and property tycoon Huang Nubo planned to purchase vast swaths of land to develop tourist services. However, local resistance and national environmental and security concerns prevented the finalisation of these transactions, and in the Lyngen case, the construction of the tourist resort itself.
Way Forward
Some modes of Chinese presence in the Arctic may adversely affect the current, generally positive attitude towards Chinese investors in the polar region. These include: major land purchases, especially in areas of high environmental, biodiversity or landscape value; bringing in Chinese workforce in significant numbers; and the involvement of Chinese construction companies on terms that would be perceived by local actors as unfair competition[xv]. Decision-makers in Arctic Council must apply particular scrutiny in the case of investments that would give Chinese companies influence over the construction and use of critical infrastructure such as railways or airports.
Beijing has increasingly involved in regional international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, to signal its willingness to exercise state power under institutional constraints. These approaches aim to send a series of costly signals to conventional Arctic states, reassuring them that China is “not a revisionist power” that pursues hegemony[xvi] in the region. As a now isolated Russia seeks new partnerships with “friendly” States for Arctic missions, the threat of an Arctic divided between East and West grows. With accelerating loss of sea-ice due to climate change, opening up the Arctic to greater resource exploitation and shipping, animosity in the North will further threaten this fragile ecosystem. Thus, Chinese ventures in the Arctic could further accelerate climate change vulnerabilities and its associated traditional & non-traditional security issues impacting the wider region.
Sources:
[i] https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1332814/chinas-arctic-policy/1936840/
[ii] https://research.fak.dk/esploro/outputs/essay/The-Polar-Regions-as-New-Strategic/991935181503741
[iii] https://arctic-council.org/about/observers/peoples-republic-of-china/
[iv] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2015.1017757
[v] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2022.2078278
[vi] https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-031-25399-7_22-1
[vii] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X24000587
[viii] https://research.fak.dk/esploro/outputs/bookChapter/The-Evolving-Chinese-Strategic-Approach-in/991935181603741
[ix] https://uijrt.com/articles/v5/i5/UIJRTV5I50007.pdf
[x] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X24001817
[xi] https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/01/norway-blocks-sale-last-private-land-svalbard-china-interest#maincontent
[xii] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2023.2179535
[xiii] https://www.utupub.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/164315/FinnishGovernment_ChinaintheArctic_Kauppila%20.pdf?sequence=1
[xiv] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2154896X.2016.1241486
[xv] https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003401148-3/understanding-sunk-chinese-seaport-investments-northern-europe-kirsten-kaarre-jensen
[xvi] https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7222
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