Under Putin, Russians Have Become ‘Consumers But Not Citizens’ – OpEd

One of the most widespread beliefs among Russians is that change will come as one generation displaces another; but that did not happen in the Soviet Union and it won’t happen in a post-Putin Russia --- at least not by itself – and those who are counting on it shouldn’t, Andrey Kolesnikov argues.

The younger generation of Russians did grow up “in an era of markets, new communications technologies, and a consumerist civilization, the New Times columnist says; but they did so without democracy” and thus become “consumers but not citizens” prepared to take responsibility for themselves and their country (newtimes.ru/articles/detail/247742).

“Not only did the patterns of human behavior not change with the appearance of new generations,” Kolesnikov says; but individuals in the rising generation adapted to circumstances rather than challenging them. Indeed, things got much worse with a growth in the new generation of passive conformists” who rapidly “turn into active conformists.”

To be sure, the columnist continues, “the younger age groups are less supportive of the war and the regime but they still support both. And denunciations are written not only by those older and more senior in rank but by young or relatively young ‘concerned citizens’” who are not as different from their elders as many expected.

Several decades ago, many Russians assumed that if their country had “transparent and free communications,” the kind of people that the Soviet state with its censorship and control could not form. There was even “incredibly naïve talk about ‘the party of television’ versus ‘the party of the Internet.”

But it has turned out that fundamental changes are not about the freedom of information but rather about how it is understood and analyzed. Those characteristics of the Russian population did not change. And “after February 2022, the situation got even worse: to know the truth, you need to want to know it and to get real information you must want to receive it.”

To be sure, “there are millions of wonderful young people” in Russia “who don’t accept the unnatural policies of the Kremlin and are horrified, including for personal reasons by the war … They would like to live differently.” And many of them have been heroic in their response to what is going on.

But there are a far larger number who have adapted to what the regime wants and, in many ways, gone ever further in that direction than their parents, Kolesnikov says. Consequenlty, “the solution to the problem Russia faces” will not be solved by generational change by itself. Far more will have to happen.

The anthropological and psychological type that characterized the Brezhnev era or even Stalin’s is returning incredibly rapidly and among the young ever bit as much as among their elders. That must be recognized rather than continuing to act as if time by itself will solve Russia’s fundamental problems.